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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the association between audit committee characteristics (independence, expertise and activities)
and the amendments of quarterly financial reports of Malaysian companies. Control variables, namely size of board of
directors, size of company, profitability and auditor are also included in this study. In this study, each of the 63 sampled
companies that amended their quarterly reports in 2005 is matched with a company that did not make any amendments.
Results of the regression test indicate that companies having audit committees with two or more financial experts are
less likely to amend their quarterly reports. Although other variables (except for auditor) appear to have a negative
association with amendments, statistically the association is insignificant. This study also observed that most of the
amendments are due to oversight, mathematical mistakes and typographical errors. The findings suggest that to be
effective, audit committees should have more than one financial expert.
ABSTRAK
Kertas ini mengkaji hubungan antara ciri-ciri jawatankuasa audit (kebebasan, kepakaran dan aktiviti) dan pindaan
terhadap laporan suku tahunan syarikat. Pemboleh ubah kawalan seperti saiz lembaga pengarah, saiz dan
keberuntungan syarikat, dan juru audit juga diambilkira dalam kajian ini. Dalam kajian ini, kesemua 63 syarikat
yang dikaji yang meminda laporan suku tahunan bagi tahun 2005 dipadankan dengan syarikat yang tidak membuat
sebarang pindaan. Hasil ujian regresi menunjukkan lembaga pengarah yang mempunyai dua atau lebih orang pakar
dalam bidang kewangan tidak mempunyai kecenderungan untuk meminda laporan suku tahunan. Walaupun faktor
lain (kecuali juru audit) mempunyai hubungan yang negatif dengan pindaan, secara statistik hubungan adalah tidak
signifikan. Kajian juga menunjukkan yang pindaan biasanya dibuat atas alasan terlepas pandang, kesilapan matematik,
dan kesilapan menaip. Penemuan kajian menunjukkan bahawa bagi mewujudkan jawatankuasa audit yang berkesan,
seharusnya ia mempunyai lebih daripada seorang pakar dalam bidang kewangan.
INTRODUCTION
The Malaysian government has taken initiatives as early
as 1994 by mandating audit committee to all public listed
companies in the country. Furthermore, because of major
corporate governance collapses worldwide, the
government, through Ministry of Finance has established
a High Level Finance Committee with the task of reviewing
and reforming corporate governance practices in Malaysia.
This committee was assigned to come out with the
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG). The
Code was first issued in March 2000. While the Code
remains as a voluntary guide and is meant to be non-
statutory and self-regulatory, in January 2001, Bursa
Malaysia (formerly known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock
Exchange) strengthened its efforts towards enhancing
corporate governance practices in Malaysia by revamping
its Listing Requirements. For instance, Chapter 15 of the
revamped Listing Requirements specifically addresses
corporate governance issues, and in particular the
recommendations of the MCCG have become an integral
part of the revamped Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements
(BMLR). In relation to audit committee, the MCCG suggests
that the board should establish an audit committee with at
least three directors, a majority of whom are independent
and the chairman of the audit committee should be an
independent non-executive director. Part 2 of the Code
also specifies the duties of audit committees and the need
for the board to establish an internal audit function.
Compliance to Part 2 of the Code is voluntary but firms are
required to state in their annual reports the extent of their
compliance with an explanation for any departure.
An audit committee is an important board committee
that monitors the management and assists the board of
directors in overseeing and ensuring adequate functioning
of internal control mechanisms (Hasnah, Jantan & Eow
2005). An audit committee helps determine indicators of
problems, mitigate possible damages, and enhance
shareholders’ value. One of the duties of the audit
committee is to oversee companies’ financial performance
and ensure the reliability of their reporting. As outlined in
the MCCG (Finance Committee on Corporate Governance
2000), an audit committee is to review the quarterly and
year-end financial statements of a company. The review
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should focus on any changes in accounting policies and
practices, significant adjustment arising from the audit,
the going concern assumption and compliance with
accounting standards and other legal requirements. The
audit committee should also discuss problems and
reservations arising from the interim and final audits and
any matter the auditor may wish to discuss (in the absence
of management, where necessary).
Recently, the issue of whether the audit committees
are effective in carrying out their duties has been the
subject of numerous investigations. This is because of
the pervasive cases of financial statement errors and
irregularities, which in some cases amount to fraudulent
reporting. Recent cases of accounting irregularities in
Malaysia include companies such as Megan Media
Holdings Berhad, NasionCom Holdings Berhad, United
U-LI Corporation Berhad and Transmile Group Berhad.
Bursa Malaysia requires financial statement errors and
regularities to be restated immediately in an amended
quarterly report. Therefore, one way of assessing the
effectiveness of an audit committee is by observing the
amendments made to the quarterly reports. This paper
attempts to investigate the association between
amendments of quarterly financial reporting and audit
committee characteristics. This is because it is the duty of
the audit committees to review the quarterly financial
statements and ensure that they are reliable. We particularly
focus on the amendments made to quarterly reporting
because to our knowledge, no such specific studies have
been conducted in Malaysia. Similar to prior studies (see
The U.S General Accounting Office (GAO) 2003; Abbott et
al. 2004), this study presumes that weak audit committee
is at least partially responsible for financial reporting errors
that manifest ultimately as amendments. In particular, the
objective of this study is to determine whether audit
committee characteristics (namely committee
independence, members’ expertise and activity) are
associated with amendments of the quarterly reports.
These characteristics are tested based on the belief that
to be effective, an audit committee should among others,
be independent, financially literate and meet regularly. In
addition, this study explores the reasons as to why
quarterly reports are amended.
Amended quarterly reports are the quarterly reports
published and issued after the first report has been
released and before the next quarter’s report is issued.
When a quarterly report is amended, a new set of financial
statements would be submitted to Bursa Malaysia and
released to the public on its website. There are a number
of studies regarding audit committee characteristics and
restatements of financial reporting (Agrawal & Chadha
2005; Abbott, Parker & Peters 2004). Abbott et al. (2004),
for example, examine the association between the
characteristics of audit committee and the likelihood of
financial statement restatements. As far as we are
concerned, most of the studies were concentrated outside
Malaysia. Perhaps, the closest studies to ours are those
conducted by Norman, Mohd Iskandar and Rahmat (2007)
and Hasnah et al. (2005). The former examines the
effectiveness of audit committee characteristics in
monitoring management behaviour with respect to their
incentives to manage earnings. It is found that the presence
of a fully independent audit committee reduces earnings
management practices, and the interaction between
proportion of audit committee members with accounting
knowledge and the frequency of meeting is significantly
related to earnings management practices. The latter
investigates whether financial distress in companies is
associated with audit committee effectiveness. However,
there was no evidence of association between the financial
health of companies and audit committee effectiveness.
This study is a significant contribution because it
examines the effectiveness of audit committees in
monitoring the reliability of quarterly reporting in an
emerging market and in a Southeast Asia region, Malaysia.
Malaysia. Like most other Southeast Asian markets,
Malaysia faces challenges in developing reliable and
transparent corporate financial reporting. As discussed
by Zarinah and Kar (2003), the following factors may
contribute to the challenges: companies having high
degree of family ownership, minority shareholders and
institutional investors are generally passive, many boards
and audit committees are not effective oversight
mechanisms, and enforcement systems are generally
inadequate. More importantly, this study will determine
if the initiatives taken by the authorities to require
companies to have audit committees that are
independent, financially literate and “active” are
supported. As the Malaysian market is similar to some
other Southeast Asian markets such as Thailand and
Indonesia, the findings of this study would be useful to
the business societies in the region.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.
In the next section, a review of the requirements for
quarterly reporting and audit committee in Malaysia will
be presented. Next, there will be a review of literature
regarding audit committee effectiveness. It is followed by
sections on hypothesis development and research
methods. Next, the findings will be discussed, and finally,
the paper will end with a conclusion section.
INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
All companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia are required
to issue quarterly financial reports since 1999 to replace
half-yearly reports, following the 1997/98 Asian financial
crisis. The reports are to be issued to the Exchange within
60 days after the end of the quarter and they need not be
audited. Bursa Malaysia will subsequently release the
quarterly financial reports to the public on its website.
The Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement (BMLR) requires
companies to correct inaccurate, incomplete or misleading
financial disclosure in a timely manner. Where quarterly
financial reporting is concerned, the corrected report is
usually released as an amended quarterly financial report,
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before the next quarterly report is due for release. The
amendment provides an explicit acknowledgement of
material omissions, or misstatements in the previously
issued financial statement. Similar to the original report,
the amended report will include the whole set of financial
statements.
The Listing Requirements require every company to
form an audit committee comprising of at least three
members, a majority of whom should be independent
directors. A director is classified as independent if he or
she is a non-management director, free of any family
relationship or any material or business relationship (other
than stock ownership and the directorship) with the
company or its management. This requirement is imposed
to improve investors’ confidence and enhance the
capability of audit committees to achieve their objectives
and to promote better corporate governance and
transparency in the capital market.
In order to fulfill audit committee responsibilities for
monitoring internal control and financial reporting, audit
committee members should possess the necessary
financial expertise. The Listing Requirements requires that
at least one of the audit committee members is a member of
The Malaysian Institute of Accountant (MIA) or if he or
she is not a member of MIA, he or she must have at least 3
years’ working experience and (1) must have passed the
examinations specified in Part l of the 1st Schedule of the
Accountants Act 1967; or (2) must be a member of one of
the associations of accountants specified in the Act; or
fulfils such other requirement as prescribed by Bursa
Malaysia. In short, to be considered a financial expert, an
audit committee member should possess an accounting
background.
AUDIT COMMITTEE EFFECTIVENESS
In an agency framework of a company, the board of
directors (BOD) and the audit committee evolve as
monitoring mechanisms because of a separation of
ownership from control and a possible discrepancy of
the incentives of outside shareholders and managers.
According to Fama and Jensen (1983), agency theory
suggests that owing to the separation of corporate
management and ownership, shareholders require
protection because management may have agendas
different from their owners and thus may not always act
in the owners’ best interest. Hence, based on agency
theory, the formation of an audit committee is expected
to protect the interest of the principal and to ensure that
the management carries out its roles in accordance with
the contract. However, audit committees are not
necessarily effective in carrying out their duties. For
instance, an audit committee may not be effective if its
members are not independent of management. Audit
committees may also be ineffective in monitoring the
financial reports if none of the members is accounting
literate.
Several approaches have been adopted in measuring
the effectiveness of audit committees. According to Song
and Windram (2004), one of the ways is to seek perceptions
of economic players such as the internal and external
auditors and audit committees as to various measures of
effectiveness. Another approach is by examining the
activities carried out by the audit committees (Menon &
Williams 1994). Other studies associate the effectiveness
of audit committees with the quality of financial reports of
which the latter is measured, among others, by compliance
with accounting standards (Song & Windram 2004),
earnings management (Klein 2002), accounting fraud
(Beasley 1996) and financial restatements (Abbott et al.
2004). DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault and Reed
(2002) provide a comprehensive review of literature on
audit committee effectiveness. Our approach mirrors the
method used by Abbott et al. (2004), except that we
examine the restatements of quarterly reports, instead of
annual reports.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Another aspect of audit committee that has been the
subject of investigation is the influence of audit committee
characteristics on its effectiveness. The recent
requirements by stock exchanges and other authoritative
bodies worldwide have implicitly assumed that
independence, financial literacy and activity of an audit
committee will improve its effectiveness. Thus, we develop
the hypotheses as discussed below.
AUDIT COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE
Based on agency theory, the more independent the audit
committee is, the more effective it would be in monitoring
managerial opportunism. DeZoort and Salterio (2001), for
example, found that when there were disputes between
management and external auditors, independent audit
committee members were more likely to support the
auditors rather than the management. Independent audit
committee members add value to a firm as they bring in
experience and reputation that help improve the
committee’s decision making and effectiveness in
performing their monitoring duties. It is also argued that
independent audit committees have a greater incentive to
avoid activities that would damage their reputation than
non-independent audit committees (Abbott & Parker
2000).
Various studies provide evidence of the positive
influence of audit committee independence on its
effectiveness. Among others, Song and Windram (2004)
provided strong evidence that in the UK, audit committee
independence was negatively associated with the
violation of accounting standards. In another study, Klein
(2002) showed that audit committee independence was
negatively associated with abnormal accruals. Abbott and
Parker (2000) suggested that independent audit committees
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were less likely to be involved in fraudulent or misleading
financial reporting. Along the same vein, Beasley, Carcello,
Hermanson, and Lapides (2000) found that fraud
companies in the technology, healthcare and financial
service industries appeared to have a lower level of audit
committee independence compared to non-fraud
companies. The foregoing discussion leads us to the
following hypothesis:
H1: There is a negative association between the
independence of audit committee and the amendment
of quarterly reporting.
AUDIT COMMITTEE FINANCIAL EXPERTISE
The expertise requirement is generally fulfilled by having
a background in accounting that permits the board to
conclude in good faith that the director is capable of
understanding the most complex issues of accounting and
finance encountered in the course of the company’s
business. Moores (2004) as cited in Razaee, Olibe, and
Mimmier (2003) argues that an audit committee with
financial literacy would have the ability to understand the
important accounting judgments management makes, why
management makes them and how management can use
those judgments to manipulate financial statements.
The reported empirical evidence supports the
argument that financially literate and expert audit committee
is beneficial to a company. Bedard, Chtourou, and
Courteau (2004) suggest that an audit committee whose
members have more financial experts is more effective in
constraining earnings management. They find that the
presence of at least one member with financial expertise is
associated with a lower likelihood of aggressive earnings
management.
Agrawal and Chadha (2005) show that the probability
of earnings restatement is lower in companies whose audit
committees have an independent director with a
background in accounting or finance. Abbott et al. (2004)
find that the absence of a financial expert on the audit
committee is significantly associated with an increased
probability of financial misstatement and financial fraud.
Along the same vein, Xie, Davidson and Dadalt (2003)
show that the presence of investment bankers on an audit
committee is associated with lower discretionary accruals
in companies. DeFond, Hann and Hu (2004) report a
positive market response to the addition of a financial
expert to the audit committee.
Using an experimental approach, McDaniel, Martin
and Maines (2002) examine the effect of financial expertise
on audit committee’s judgments of financial reporting
quality. They find that a financial expert is able to
distinguish certain quality shortcomings in financial
reporting issues that a financial illiterate member is not
able to distinguish. Pearce and Zahra (1991) found that
boards lacking expertise and independence were less
powerful and had less than superior corporate financial
performance.
There is an increasing recognition that service on an
audit committee might require an occupational background
that provides a strong working knowledge, business
practices and concepts (Kesner 1988). Kalbers and
Forgarty (1993) note that an audit committee member with
skills in accounting and finance as well as knowledge of
the company and industry could contribute to the
effectiveness of the committee and thus provide “expert
power”. DeZoort (1998) documents that audit committee
members with auditing or previous internal control
evaluation experience make better judgments of the internal
control oversight. According to DeZoort and Salterio
(2001), audit committee expertise increases the possibility
that detected material misstatements will be communicated
to the audit committee and corrected in a timely fashion.
Collectively, the above evidence suggests that audit
committee expertise can reduce restatement of financial
reporting, leading to the following hypothesis:
H2: There is a negative association between financial
expertise of an audit committee and the amendment
of quarterly reporting.
The level of financial expertise is measured as follows:
a score of “1” is given if there are two or more financial
experts, otherwise “0” is given. Consistent with BMLR and
as mentioned earlier, an audit committee member is
considered an expert if he or she is a member of the MIA, or
if he or she is not a member of the MIA, he or she must
have at least 3 years’ working experience and (1) must
have passed the examinations specified in Part l of the 1st
Schedule of the Accountants Act 1967; or (2) must be a
member of one of the associations of accountants
specified in the Act; or fulfils such other requirement as
prescribed by Bursa Malaysia.
AUDIT COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES (MEETINGS)
An active audit committee would indicate the level of effort
that has been made to ensure quality financial reporting.
Activity can be measured in different ways, such as
meeting frequency, meeting duration and information
exchange during the meeting (Song & Windram 2004). It
has been suggested in the literature that meetings are
significant events for monitoring financial reporting
(Menon & Williams 1994).
The number of meetings held by an audit committee
in a year would give an indication of how active the
committee is. In Malaysia, the regulation does not stipulate
a minimum number of meetings that shall be held by an
audit committee. Kang (2001) suggest that at least five
meetings annually are required to gain sufficient insight
into the firm’s financial situation.
Meanwhile, the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) and
the Treadway Commission (1987) suggested that audit
committees should meet at least four times a year. Abbott
et al. (2004) find that companies with audit committee
meetings of at least four times annually have lower
occurrence of financial reporting restatement compared
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to those with less than four meetings. Xie et al. (2002)
found that audit committee meeting frequency is directly
associated with reduced level of discretionary current
accruals. Abbott, Park and Parker (2000) provided evidence
that audit committees that met at least twice a year were
less likely to be sanctioned by the US Securities
Commission (SEC) for fraudulent financial reporting.
Similarly, Beasley et al. (2000) revealed that audit
committees of fraud companies in the technology and
healthcare industries held fewer meetings than industry
benchmarks. Although not statistically significant, Song
and Windram (2004) provided an indication that an audit
committee that meets regularly has a positive influence on
its effectiveness as far as conformance with the accounting
standards is concerned.
Based on the above discussion, it is believed that a
committee that meets more often should be able to devote
more time to issues regarding the quality of financial
reporting. Therefore, this study expects the incidence of
amendments to be inversely related to the number of audit
committee’s meeting. The hypothesis to be tested is as
follows:
H3: There is a negative association between the number
of audit committee meetings and the amendment of
quarterly reports.
CONTROL VARIABLES
This paper acknowledges that various other variables may
also influence the quality of financial reporting. For the
purpose of this study, board of director size, company
size, company performance and auditor are used as control
variables. Size of the board of directors is expected to
have a negative influence on the amendments. Larger
boards provide a bigger pool of candidates from which
audit committees are appointed. Size of a company is also
expected to be negatively associated with the amendments
of financial reporting. This is because large companies
have greater resources which would enable them to appoint
reputable auditors and non-executive directors, thus
improving audit committee effectiveness (Song &
Windram 2004). Beasley et al. (2000), for example, found
that companies committing fraud are relatively small. We
also expect that size of an auditor would have a positive
impact on the quality of financial reporting. Large auditors
are more concerned with maintaining their reputation, and
thus are less likely to produce erroneous reports. Although
quarterly reports are not necessarily audited, auditors play
a role in reviewing the quarterly reports. In her survey, Ku
Nor Izah (2003) for example found that about one-third of
sampled companies in Malaysia had their first three
quarterly reports reviewed by the auditors (although none
were audited). As for the final quarter’s report, 60 percent
and 20 percent of the companies had the reports audited
and reviewed, respectively.
Previous studies often associate financial
misstatements with less profitable or troubled companies.
As cited by Beasley (1996), companies with poor financial
performance would place too much emphasis on earnings
and profitability, thus would be more likely to commit
financial fraud. Similarly, we believe poor performing firms
are more likely to produce financial statement errors that
ultimately result in amendments.
RESEARCH METHODS
DATA COLLECTION
Data are collected from the Bursa Malaysia website by
searching all quarterly financial reports published in year
2005 that were later amended. Quarterly reports of the year
2005 (being the latest reports available at the time the study
was conducted) are investigated. Because quarterly
financial reports were introduced in 1999, we believe that
by 2005 companies are already used to preparing the
reports. Thus, non-accounting and unintentional errors
would be much reduced. Only companies listed on the
main board of Bursa Malaysia are investigated. This is
because they are large and more likely to be followed by
analysts. Out of 647 main board companies listed in 2005,
126 (19.5 percent) amended their quarterly reports during
the year. The amended quarterly reports of these 126
companies are observed in identifying the reasons for
amendments. In determining the influence of audit
committee on amendments, one-half of these companies
(63) are selected as the subjects of investigation. A
proportionate stratified random sampling technique based
on sectors is used. The distribution of companies
according to sectors is depicted in Table 1. A majority of
the companies are from the trading/services, industrial
product and consumer product sectors.
TABLE 1. Distribution of sampled companies by sector
Bursa Malaysia sector No. of amend Sampled
companies companies
Trading/Services 32 16
Industrial Product 31 15









Accordingly, each of the 63 sampled companies that
amend their quarterly reports is matched with a non-amend
company. This results in a total of 126 companies in the
sample, representing 19.5 percent of the main board
companies. According to Roscoe’s rule of thumb (Sekaran
2003), a sample that is larger than 30 and less than 500 is
appropriate for most research, and in order to run a multiple
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regression analysis, an average of 10 observations per
variable is sufficient. Having a sample size of 126 and seven
variables in the model, our sample size more than meets
the requirement. Subsequently, annual reports of selected
companies are collected in order to scrutinize the Audit
Committee Report therein and to collect other relevant
information about the companies.
There are two ways of selecting the control or matching
companies, either by randomly selecting the non-amend
companies, or by matching each of the amend company
with a non-amend company having similar characteristics,
such as business activities and size. For the purpose of this
study we use the latter approach, an approach commonly
used by researchers (see, for example, Wan Nordin 2009).
Initially, each of the amend company is matched with a
company listed on the main board of Bursa Malaysia and
having the same core business. If there are more than one
company having the same core business, a company with
total assets closest to the amend company is chosen.
DATA ANALYSIS
A multiple logistic regression represented as follows is
used to test the hypotheses.
AMEND = α + β1INDAC + β2EXPERT + β3MEET + β4BDSIZE
+ β5COSIZE + β6ROA + β7AUDIT + ε
where,
AMEND= “1” if a company amends and “0” if a company
does not amend.
INDAC = Independence of audit committee measured by
the percentage of independent directors in the
audit committee. A director is considered
independent if he or she is a non-management
director, free of any family relationship or any
material or business relationship (other than
stock ownership and the directorship) with the
company or its management.
EXPERT = Financial expertise of the audit committee, “1”
if there are two or more financial experts, and
“0” if less than two. One is considered an expert
if he or she is a member of the MIA, or if he or
she is not a member of the MIA, he or she must
have at least 3 years’ working experience and
(i) must have passed the examinations specified
in Part l of the 1st Schedule of the Accountants
Act 1967; or (ii) must be a member of one of the
associations of accountants specified in the
Act; or fulfils such other requirement as
prescribed by Bursa Malaysia.
MEET = Level of activity, measured by the number of
meetings in the financial year.
BDSIZE = Size of the board of directors, measured by the
number of directors on the board.
COSIZE = Size of a company, measured by the natural log
of total assets.
ROA = Performance of a company, measured by return
on assets.
AUDIT = Auditor of a company, “1” if audited by Big 4,
“0” otherwise.
ε = error term of residual.
The measurements used in measuring the above
variables are consistent with those adopted in other similar
studies (Abbott et al. 2004; Beasley et al. 2000; Bedard
et al. 2004; Klein 2002; McDaniel et al. 2002).
FINDINGS
An analysis of the amendments reveals that a majority of
the companies (102 out of 126 or 81 percent) amend only
once during the year. Nineteen (15 percent) of the
companies amended twice and 5 others issued three
amendments, which gives a total of 155 amendments (see
Table 2).
Table 2 shows the distribution of amendments
according to quarters. It appears that a majority of the
amendments (40.6 percent) are related to the fourth
quarter’s report. The first and third quarterly reports
accounted for 22.6 and 21.9 percent of the amendments,
respectively, while only 14.8 percent of the amendments
are related to the second quarter’s reports. It is not
surprising that more amendments are made to the fourth
quarter’s report than any other reports. This is because
the fourth quarter’s report, covering not only the quarter
but also the whole year, is just like another annual report.
Companies would try to produce the same figures in both
reports because any difference that arises between the
fourth quarter’s report and the annual report is to be
explained to Bursa Malaysia. Therefore, it is likely that
companies amend the errors before they issue the audited
annual reports.
Upon reviewing the amended quarterly reports, six
reasons for amendments were identified. Some companies
had more than one reason. Table 3 shows the distribution
of the reasons. It appears that a majority of the amendments
are due to oversight (26.9 percent), mathematical mistakes
(26.4 percent), and typographical errors (23.9 percent).
They are followed by incorrect used of existing facts (18%).
Two other reasons, change in presentation and errors in
the application of accounting principles, are infrequent.
TABLE 2. Distribution of amendments by quarter
Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 Total
No. of amendments 35 (22.6%) 23 (14.8%) 34 (21.9%) 63 (40.6%) 155
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The question of whether the amendments are due to
errors or irregularities is however, not addressed in this
study. According to Gleason, Jenkins and Johnson (2004),
errors are unintentional misstatements in the financial
statement, while irregularities are intentional
misstatements. Intent is often difficult to determine in
practice, particularly in matters involving accounting
estimates and the application of accounting principles.
Mere observation of the reasons shows that most of the
amendments in this study are likely due to errors since 78
percent of the reasons are either mathematical, or
typographical errors, or due to oversight. Although these
amendments are less likely to be caused by irregularities,
the misstatements or omissions would still jeopardize the
reliability of the reports.
Table 4 shows the composition of the audit
committees of amend and control companies with regard
to independence, financial expertise and number of
meetings. Generally, amend companies are less
independent, have lesser number of financial experts and
meet less regularly compared to control companies. This
is consistent with prior evidence such as that of Song and
Windram (2004). A majority of audit committees (94.4%)
meet the requirements of the BMLR in which a majority of
the audit committee members are independent. However,
seven (5.6%) of the sampled companies did not observe
the requirement. The overall mean for the percentage of
independent directors in each audit committee is 70
percent.
As for the number of financial experts, Table 4 shows
that a majority of the audit committees (98.4%) have at
least one financial expert. Only two audit committees
(1.6%) did not have any experts and thus did not comply
with the Listing Requirements. The overall mean number
of experts is 1.10. Comparing this result with that of Hasnah
et al. (2005), there appear to be an improvement as far as
expertise is concerned. Hasnah et al. found that 91% of
the companies in their studies have at least one member of
audit committee who is financially literate. A Pearson
correlation analysis shows that the number of experts is
positively correlated with the size of a company.
Although Bursa Malaysia does not specify the
number of meetings to be held by an audit committee,
there have been suggestions that audit committees should
at least meet four or five times a year (Blue Ribbon
Committee 1999; Kang 2001). Table 4 shows that a majority
of the audit committees meet between four to six times a
year with a mean of 5. Only 4 audit committees (3.2%) meet
less than four times. This is consistent with Hasnah et al.
(2005) who found that 99 percent of the sampled firms
meet at least four times a year. The Pearson correlation
coefficients reveal that companies that are bigger in size
and board size tend to meet more regularly. This is expected
as bigger companies and boards would have more policies
and decisions to be made. However, it is observed that the
number of meetings is not associated with industry type.
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of the
variables and the results of the univariate analysis
comparing the difference in means between companies
that amend and companies that do not. INDAC (audit
TABLE 3. Reasons for amendments
Reasons of amendments Frequency Percent (%)
1. Oversight 45 26.9
2. Mistakes in mathematics 44 26.4
3. Typographical error 40 23.9
4. Incorrect use of existing facts 30 18.0
5. Change in presentation 5 3.0
6. Errors in application of
the accounting principle 3 1.8
Total 167 100%
TABLE 4. Composition of audit committees
Amend company Control company Total
Variables Freq. (%) Mean Freq. (%) Mean Freq. (%) Mean
AC independence:
50% and less 5 (7.9%) 2 (3.2%) 7 (5. 6%)
More than 50% 58 (92.1%) 61 (96.8%) 119 (94.4%)
Total 63 0.68 63 0.71 126 0.70
No. of experts:
0 0 (0.0%) 2 (3.2%) 2 (1.6%)
1 61 (96.8%) 49 (77.8%) 110 (87.3%)
2 2 (3.2%) 11 (17.4%) 13 (10.3%
3 0 (0.0%) 1 (1.6%) 1 (0.8%)
Total 63 1.03 63 1.17 126 1.10
No. of meetings:
1-3 3 (4.8%) 1 (1.6%) 4 (3.2%)
4-6 57 (90.4%) 55 (87.2%) 112 (88.8%)
7-9 2 (3.2%) 6 (9.6%) 8 (6.4%)
10 and more 1 (1.6%) 1 (1.6%) 2 (1.6%)
Total 63 4.86 63 5.14 126 5.0
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committee independence), NMEXPERT (number of experts),
EXPERT (whether companies have two or more experts),
and BDSIZE (size of board of directors) seem to differ
between the two groups of companies, significantly.
Results suggest that amend companies are more likely to
have audit committees that are less independent and less
financially expert. Amend companies also tend to have
smaller board of directors. The mean size of boards is 7 for
amend companies, and 8 for non-amend companies. The
above results are consistent with most of the previous
findings. Other variables (MEET, COSIZE, ROA and AUDIT)
do not appear to differ.
TABLE 5. Descriptive statistics and t-test
Amend companies Control companies t-test
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Sig.
INDAC 0.677 0.105 0.714 0.191 0.066*
NMEXPERT 1.03 0.177 1.17 0.493 0.032**
EXPERT 0.03 0.177 0.19 0.396 0.004***
MEET 4.86 1.635 5.14 1.83 0.357
BDSIZE 7.16 1.752 7.89 1.902 0.027**
COSIZE (LnAssets) 19.947 1.919 20.296 2.112 0.334
ROA 0.523 4.087 2.212 12.159 0.298
AUDIT 0.83 0.383 0.83 0.383 1.000
*Significant at 10 percent level.
**Significant at 5 percent level.
***Significant at 1 percent level.
Where:
INDAC = Percentage of independent directors in the
audit committee.
NMEXPERT = Number of financial experts in the audit
committee.
EXPERT = “1” if there are two or more financial experts
in the audit committee, and “0” if less than
two.
MEET = Number of audit committee meetings in the
financial year.
BDSIZE = Number of directors on the board.
COSIZE = Natural log of total assets.
ROA = Return on assets.
AUDIT = “1” if audited by Big 4, “0” otherwise.
Where board independence is concerned, the result
is in line with agency theory that holds that greater
independence would result is greater monitoring of
managerial opportunism. Independent audit committees
tend to avoid activities that would damage their reputation
(Abbott & Parker 2000). This study also supports the
argument that a financially expert audit committee is more
effective in reducing financial statement errors,
irregularities and earnings management. This is because
the experts understand the accounting and financial issues
faced by companies. As far as board size is concerned,
this study supports the contention that larger boards
would provide a larger pool of experts from which audit
committee members are appointed. Thus, companies with
larger boards are more likely to produce quality financial
reports.
For the purpose of regression, we drop NMEXPERT
and use EXPERT because a majority of companies have
only one expert. To detect any significant multicollinearity
problem, we conducted a pair-wise correlation analysis,
the results of which are depicted in Table 6. The highest
correlation coefficient of 0.509, that is between company
size and ROA shows that there does not appear to be a
multicollinearity problem in the model.
Table 7 presents the results of the logistic regression.
Cox & Snell R2 and Nagelkerke R2 account for 12.6 percent
TABLE 6. Pearson correlation coefficients (n = 126)
IND EXPERT MEET BDSIZE COSIZE ROA AUDIT
AMEND -.164 -.253** -.083 -.197 -.087 -.093 .000
INDAC .110 .088 .137 .111 -.075 -.013
EXPERT .117 .091 .219* -.051 .096
MEET .216* .313** .047 .133
BDSIZE .226* .070 .062
COSIZE  -.509** .127
ROA .069
* Significant at 5 percent level (2-tailed).
** Significant at 1 percent level (2-tailed).
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and 16.9 percent of the variation, respectively. Hosmer-
Lemeshow statistics (p = 0.206) show that the model fit is
acceptable. The classification table (Table 8) indicates how
many observations have been predicted correctly. It shows
a prediction of 61.1% correctness. Generally, the higher
the overall percentage of correct predictions, the better
the model is. This indicates that the results statistically
support the model used in the analysis.
CONCLUSIONS
The requirement for companies to form an audit committee
is aimed to improve investors’ confidence in the capital
market. One of the tasks of an audit committee is to oversee
companies’ financial performance and ensure the reliability
of their reporting including the annual and quarterly
reports. Despite the existence of audit committees in all
listed companies, financial statement errors which give
rise to amendments of the financial statements (annual
and quarterly) are common among companies in Malaysia.
This study examines if characteristics of an audit committee
(namely independence, expertise and activity) would
influence the quality of financial quarterly reports issued,
particularly by examining the amended reports. Board of
director size, company size, company performance and
auditor are the control variables. Univariate analysis
provides evidence that companies that amend are more
likely to have audit committees that are less independent,
comprised of less than two financial experts and have
smaller board of directors. Results of the regression test
support the univariate analysis that to be more effective
in monitoring financial statements, audit committees
should comprise of at least two financial experts. The
regression results provide an indication that other
variables (except for auditor) also affect the amendments
in the hypothesized direction (negatively) but statistically
they are not significant.
Results also show that most of the companies amend
their quarterly reports due to oversight and to correct
mathematical mistakes and typographical errors. Although
it is not the intention of this study to observe if the
amendments are due to errors or irregularities, the reasons
imply that they are more likely to be errors.
Overall, this study supports the initiatives taken by
the relevant authorities at tightening up the rules and
regulations pertaining to audit committees in ensuring that
they perform their responsibilities effectively. The
requirement by Bursa Malaysia that companies have at
least one member in its audit committee who is a financial
expert is a positive move. However, this study suggests
that the effectiveness of an audit committee would be
improved if it is comprised of more than one financial expert.
The authorities may consider requiring audit committees
to have more than one financial expert in the future. The
findings of this study may not only benefit the business
communities, but also the academicians and business
students. As trainers of future business managers,
academicians may use the findings in discussing issues
of corporate governance in classes.
The fact that this study only focuses the test of the
effectiveness of audit committees on only three of its
features may limit the findings. Other features of an audit
committee that may influence its effectiveness such as
the real activity of an audit committee and meeting duration
may be employed in future studies. This study is also
limited by the fact that company variables such as
complexity and internal control are not included in the
TABLE 7. Logistic regression results
Variable B S.E. Wald Sig.
INDAC -2.635 1.880 1.963 0.161
EXPERT -1.823 0.806 5.111 0.024**
MEET -0.013 0.138 0.010 0.922
BDSIZE -0.158 0.112 1.965 0.161
COSIZE -0.084 0.131 0.414 0.520
ROA -0.038 0.031 1.481 0.224
AUDIT 0.281 0.500 0.316 0.574
Constant 4.759 2.714 3.075 0.080
Notes:
1. Cox & Snell R2 = 0.126, Nagelkerke R2 = 0.169.
2. Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of fit statistic = 10.933
(p-value = 0.206).
3. ** Significant at 5 percent level.
Results of the logistic regression shows that audit
committees that have two or more experts are less likely to
produce errors and amend the quarterly reports. This
shows that increasing the number of financial experts to
two or more would improve the effectiveness of audit
committees in ensuring the quality of the quarterly reports.
The result supports the findings of previous studies such
as those of Agrawal and Chadha (2005) and Abbott et al.
(2004) that found that financial expertise on the audit
committee is negatively associated with financial
misstatements. The coefficient of INDAC (independence)
in the regression model is high and there is an indication
that it is negatively associated with amendments. However,
statistically, the regression results provide weak evidence
to support the hypothesis. Similar to what we predict, other
variables, except for AUDIT, also tend to have a negative
association with amendments. However, statistically they
are not significantly associated. This is shown by the
negative values of the coefficients for independence,
number of meetings, board size, company size and return
on assets, and a positive value for auditor.
TABLE 8. Classification tablea
Model’s Predicted Amendment
Control Amend Percentage
Company Company Correct 
AMEND Control Company 31 32 49.2
Amend Company 17 46 73.0
 Overall Percentage 61.1
a  The cut value is .500
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model. The fact that this study does not consider
interactive factors is another limitation. Future research
may also test the effectiveness of an audit committee in
monitoring the quality of financial reports by observing
the incidence of irregularities and fraud.
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